- FCC is cracking down on subsea cables that use gear from Chinese vendors
- But a “Rip and replace 2.0” would be costly and complex, analysts said
- Network security concerns continue to mount after Salt Typhoon
The U.S. government is upping its probe on Chinese telecommunications equipment, as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) sets its sights on submarine cables.
FCC Chairman Brendan Carr last week announced plans to vote on measures that would “protect submarine cables against foreign adversaries,” namely referring to vendors like Huawei and ZTE. These companies already got the cold shoulder from the U.S. wireless industry due to the government’s rip and replace program, which was established to help carriers take out Chinese equipment from their networks.
Now, a similar initiative could target Huawei and ZTE gear in subsea cabling, which Carr noted carries “99% of all internet traffic.”
“We are therefore taking action here to guard our submarine cables against foreign adversary ownership, and access as well as cyber and physical threats,” he said in a statement.
The FCC will vote on the measure at its August meeting – a move that will probably pass with flying colors since only three Commissioners remain following the departures of Geoffrey Starks and Nathan Simington earlier this year.
While a Rip and Replace 2.0 may be in the cards, putting that into practice is a different story, analysts told Fierce.
“The challenge would be funding,” said Will Townsend, VP and principal at Moor Insights & Strategy. “It's a costly endeavor as evidenced by what has occurred with mobile networks in the U.S.”
Rip and replace for years suffered a financial shortfall due to Covid-related supply chain problems and inflation, until the program in December scored $3.08 billion in fresh funding. The FCC’s newly restored auction authority will allow the Commission to use proceeds from the AWS-3 spectrum auction to finish carrying out the program.
Another potential snag in implementing subsea rip and replace is figuring out how many submarine routes actually use Huawei or ZTE gear, said Dell’Oro Analyst Jimmy Yu, “or if there is a certain route that only has Chinese equipment in it.”
“My guess is that in both cases, it is low,” he said.
The exact number is difficult to pinpoint, but CSIS has noted the majority of global undersea cables are manufactured and installed by four private firms: U.S. company SubCom, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, Nippon Electric Company from Japan and China’s HMN Technologies (formerly known as Huawei Marine Networks).
“I believe this measure will be more forward-looking and guide submarine network builders to use approved equipment, cables, and services on future submarine builds if they wish to carry data traffic from U.S. companies,” Yu added.
The aftermath of last year’s Salt Typhoon cyberattack, which hit most major U.S. operators, has understandably left the industry and lawmakers wary of future network security threats. The hackers are still going at it, reportedly exploiting routers from vendors like Cisco to breach telco networks.